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1Abstract
The paper aims at assessing the mechanics of the Great Reces-
sion, considering both its domestic propagation within the US, as well
as its spillovers to advanced and emerging economies. A total of 50
countries has been investigated by means of a large-scale open econ-
omy macroeconometric model, providing an accurate assessment of
the international macro/ﬁnance interface over the whole 1980-2009
period. It is found that a boom-bust credit cycle interpretation of
the crisis is consistent with the empirical evidence. Moreover, con-
cerning the real eﬀects of the crisis within the US, stronger evidence
of an asset prices channel, rather than a liquidity channel, has been
detected. The results also support the eﬀectiveness of the expansion-
ary ﬁscal/monetary policy mix implemented by the Fed and the US
government. Concerning the spillovers to the world economy, it is
found that while the ﬁnancial shock has spilled over to foreign coun-
tries through US housing and stock price dynamics, as well as excess
liquidity creation, the trade channel likely is the key trasmission mech-
anism of the real shock.
Keywords: Great Recession, ﬁnancial crisis, economic crisis, boom-
bust, credit cycle, international business cycle, factor vector autore-
gressive models.
JEL classiﬁcation: C22; E32; F36
21 Introduction
Looking at US business cycle history, various severe recession episodes seem
relevant to a complete understanding of recent US macroeconomic and ﬁ-
nancial developments, in particular the 1929-1933 Great Depression and the
Savings and Loans (S&L) crisis of the 1990s. In fact, though the epicen-
ter of the current ﬁnancial crisis, i.e. the US subprime mortgage market, is
peculiar, some similarities with previous episodes may be noticed.
Likewise the Great Depression and the S&L crisis, a boom-bust cycle
in credit volumes and house and stock prices, fostered by procyclical bank
loans, well summarizes the key ingredients of the crisis.1 Moreover, likewise in
the S&L episode, both a benign price stability environment and deregulated
ﬁnancial markets worked as amplifying mechanisms.2 Indeed, following the
2000 stock market crash and 2001 recession, monetary policy was extremely
accommodative, while the deepening of the “originate to distribute” banking
model and ﬁnancial engineering allowed for over stretching of credit. In
addition, since late 1990s, large capital inﬂows were also ﬁnancing a growing
current account deﬁcit in the US, mirrored by a specular surplus in emerging
Asian economies. Asset prices misalignments, particularly in the housing
and stock markets, then built up as a consequence of the savings-corporate
investment imbalance: increasingly risky investments were underwritten and
bad loans generated, sowing the seeds of the following bust phase. Still
similar to the S&L crisis, the setting in of the bust phase followed expected,
yet not materialized, housing price appreciations, which caused the predatory
lending mechanism to break down, leading to a generalized decline in asset
prices and tight credit conditions.
From an US domestic phenomenon, the crisis has then quickly spread to
the other industrialized countries, due to the tight linkages that the process
of securitization and reinsurance in the derivatives market created across
major ﬁnancial institutions worldwide, and, more in general, to the strong
degree of international ﬁnancial and economic integration, triggering local
credit crunches and consequent economic crises. Second round eﬀects, albeit
delayed, can also be found for emerging economies, particularly for those
1See Bernanke (1983) and Eichengreen and Mitchener (2004) for a boom-bust interpre-
tation of the Great Depression and the 1990 S&L crisis. See also Almunia et al. (2009),
Bordo and James (2009), Bordo and Landon-Lane (2010), Grossman and Meissner (2010)
and Temin (2010) for insightful comparisons of the recent crisis with the Great Depression.
An extensive analysis of ﬁnancial crises in a long-run historical perspective is provided by
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b).
2See Levine (2010) for an insightful account of the contribution of ﬁnancial deregulation
and policies, by creating incentives for excessive risk taking, in paving the way to the crisis
since the mid 1990s.
3more heavily relying on external ﬁnancing. Despite the expansionary policy
interventions implemented worldwide, the eﬀects of the crisis have been quite
severe: year-on-year GDP contraction at mid-2009 has indeed been sizable
for most OECD member countries, being close to or over 4%.3
Against this background, the paper aims at assessing the mechanics of
the crisis, i.e. the domestic propagation in the US and its spillover to the
other OECD countries, as well as to major emerging economies by means
of a large-scale open economy macroeconometric model, composed of near
300 equations and covering a total of 50 countries, set in the factor vector
autoregressive (F-VAR) framework. Relative to previous work in the lit-
erature, the current paper innovates as to the depth and wideness of the
analysis and econometric methodology, providing an accurate investigation
of the macro/ﬁnance interface within the US and between the US and the
world economy. The analysis is carried out on quarterly data for the period
1980:1-2009:1. While the current recessionary episode is expected to be much
deeper than any other occurred since the Great Depression, the selected sam-
ple is however large enough to cover meaningful previous boom-bust credit
cycle episodes, as for instance the US S&L crisis. To be able to evaluate
the boom-bust view of recent crisis episodes and current economic and ﬁnan-
cial developments, several variables capturing excess liquidity conditions and
ﬁnancial fragility are included in the estimated model.
To preview, the main conclusions of the paper are the following. First,
concerning dynamics within the US, our ﬁndings are quite consistent with a
boom-bust credit cycle interpretation of the crisis, as there is evidence that
buoyant US housing and stock markets, as well as low real interest rates over
the boom phase of the cycle might have been driven by excessively generous
liquidity in the system. The large US trade deﬁcit also likely contributed to
the latter dynamics, as huge capital inﬂows were redirected from the Treasury
and stocks markets to the housing market. Finally, there is evidence in
favour of the eﬀectiveness of the expansionary ﬁscal/monetary policy mix
implemented by the Fed and the US Government. Second, concerning the
spillovers of the crisis to foreign advanced and emerging economies, it is found
that the trade channel is the key transmission mechanism of the US economic
3According to Claessens et al. (2009), severe recessions tend to be deeper and longer
lasting than average recessions (-5%, rather than -2% GDP contraction; lasting 5 quarters
rather than 4 quarters), involving house prices contractions, and recovery to pre-recession
credit growth rates and upswing in house prices requiring, as for corporate investment,
about three years. According to Barro and Ursua (2009), depressions (-10% GDP growth
or less) cum stock market crash (-25% or less) would tend to last about 4 years, with stock
prices leading the recovery of about 1 year. See also Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a,b) for
additional details.
4crisis to the rest of the world, while US housing and stock price dynamics,
as well as excess liquidity generation, are the key mechanisms whereby the
US ﬁnancial crisis may have spilled over to foreign countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the
econometric methodology is introduced, while in section 3 the data and their
properties are presented. Then, in section 4 issues on speciﬁcation and es-
timation of the F-VAR model are discussed, while in sections 5 and 6 the
dynamics of the crisis in the US and its spillovers to foreign countries, re-
spectively, are investigated. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 7.
2 Econometric methodology
To investigate the linkages among the US and a large number of OECD
and emerging economies for a set of key macroeconomic variables, the fac-
tor vector autoregressive (F-VAR) framework, derived from a dynamic factor
model as in Stock and Watson (2005), is adopted. In this context, observed
comovements in the series under study are attributed to a (relatively small)
number of common dynamic factors, driven by common structural economic
disturbances. The dynamics of the observed variables not due to the common
factors are attributed to idiosyncratic (country-speciﬁc) shocks, uncorrelated
with the common disturbances. This section describes the speciﬁcation of
the factor vector autoregressive model in more detail and provides some dis-
cussion of the adopted estimation methodology.
2.1 Speciﬁcation of the Factor Vector Autoregressive
model
T h ee c o n o m e t r i cm o d e li sc o m p o s e do ft w os e t so fe q u a t i o n s .T h eﬁrst refers
to the “domestic” US economy (with variables collected in vector X), while
the second to the other  − 1 “foreign”, non-US countries (Y). The joint
dynamics of  macroeconomic variables for each of the  countries of interest
(in vector Z =[ X Y]
0) are modelled by means of the following reduced form
dynamic factor model:
F = Φ()F−1 + η (1)
G = Ψ()G−1 + ζ (2)





In (3) Z ∼ (0) is the  × 1 stationary vector of variables of interest, with





¤0 is a ×1 vector of deterministic components,
5including an intercept term, and linear or non linear trends components. F
is a  × 1 vector of (observed or unobserved) common factors, generated by
the stationary autoregressive process in (1) where Φ() is a × ﬁnite order
matrix lag polynomial, and η is a vector of shocks driving the F factors. G
is a ×1 vector of stationary foreign factors, generated by the autoregressive
process in (2) where Ψ() is a  ×  ﬁnite order matrix lag polynomial, and
ζ is a vector of disturbances driving the G factors. The eﬀects of both sets
of factors on the US and non-US variables in Z are captured by the loading
coeﬃcients collected in the matrices Λ =
£
Λ Λ¤0 and Ξ =
£
Ξ Ξ¤0 (of
dimension × and ×, respectively). Finally, D() is a × ﬁnite order





































¤0 is the  × 1 vector of reduced-form idiosyncratic (i.e.
country-speciﬁc) disturbances. It is assumed that all polynomial matrices














The speciﬁcation of the model in (1)-(5) embeds a set of important as-
sumptions on the structure of linkages across countries: (i)U Si d i o s y n c r a t i c
shocks (v
 )d on o to n l ya ﬀect the US economy (through D()), but also
have spillovers on foreign countries (through D()); (ii)d i ﬀerently, for-
eign idiosyncratic disturbances (v
 )d on o ta ﬀect US variables, while only
own-country linkages are relevant for non-US economies (D() is block
diagonal). The selected speciﬁcation is then consistent with the view that
the US play a leading role in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks;
however, this does not prevent feedbacks from the rest of the world to the
US economy, which are parsimoniously described by means of the foreign,
non-US factors G which contribute to shape macroeconomic dynamics in all
countries.
By substituting (1) and (2) into (3), the dynamic factor model can be











































































F G Z − μ






Σ 0 Σ Λ0
0 Σ Σ Ξ0
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)=Σ. Finally, the F-
V A Rf o r mi n( 7 )c a nb ei n v e r t e dt oo b t a i nt h ef o l l o w i n gr e d u c e d - f o r mv e c t o r




 = H()ε (8)
where H()=( I −H∗())−1.T h e form describes the impulse re-
sponses of the variables in Z∗
 to the factor disturbances and idiosyncratic
shocks in all countries.
The shocks in ε have the nature of reduced-form innovations, and are lin-
ear combinations of the underlying structural disturbances driving the factors
in F and G and the country-speciﬁc dynamics due to idiosyncratic shocks.
In order to investigate the transmission within the US economy of several
structural disturbances is then necessary to impose identiﬁcation schemes in
order to extract the relevant structural shocks from the reduced-form factor
disturbances in η and ζ, and from the vector of US-speciﬁc disturbances
v
 . To this aim, we impose a set of exclusion restrictions on the contem-
poraneous responses of the factors and the US variables to the structural
disturbances, implying a precise “ordering” for the elements in the F, G
and X vectors, based on plausible assumptions on the relative speed of ad-
justment to shocks. This identiﬁcation strategy is described in detail in the
Appendix.
Finally, in order to investigate the consequences of unanticipated changes
in US macroeconomic dynamics on foreign countries (i.e. the spillovers from
7the US to other economies), we rely directly on the impulse response func-
tions obtained from the reduced form F-VAR representation in (6), which is
appropriate when the focus is on the impact of a change in a given forcing
variable, say the US GDP growth rate, on the macroeconomic variables of
all foreign countries independently of the underlying economic cause (i.e. a
given structural shock). More precisely, the impact of a change in the vari-
ables of interest (the common factors in F, G and the US series in X)o n


































where V()=[ I − D()]
−1 ¡




As in Stock and Watson (2005), estimation is carried out by solving itera-















from (3) and  is
the sample size. The methodology consists of two main steps.
First, as in the current application the common factors in F are directly
observed, only a consistent preliminary estimate of the foreign factors in G
is needed. This may be obtained by the application of principal components
analysis (PCA) to the properly ﬁltered non-US series in Y.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i n
order to ensure orthogonality with the F and X components, the ﬁltered Y
series (Y∗
) are computed from the residuals of the regression of the actual Y
series on its own lags (respecting the own country constraint in (5)), lagged
X series and lagged F factors. Then, the Y∗
 vector is partitioned into
categories of variables, and the common factors are estimated sequentially as
the ﬁrst principal component for each sub-set of series. Therefore, the  static
8factors in G are separately estimated as the ﬁrst principal components from
the relevant sub-sets of variables, each including −1 series.4 For instance,
a “foreign GDP factor” is estimated as the ﬁrst principal component from
the set of the GDP growth series of the non-US countries under study.
Second, since each equation in the model does not contain the same set of
regressors, OLS estimation is not as eﬃcient as FIML. Yet, given the number
of equations involved in the current application, the latter is infeasible. A
gain in eﬃciency can however be achieved through iterated estimation as in
Stock and Watson (2005), adopting the following procedure:
1. given the preliminary estimate for the G factor obtained as described
above, we estimate the model in (3) by OLS to obtain an initial estimate
of the D(), Ξ and Λ matrices;
2. conditional to the estimate of the D(), Ξ and Λ matrices, a new
estimate of the G factors is obtained from PCA applied to the new
ﬁltered variables
¡




− ˆ ΛF − ˆ D()
¡
Z−1 − ˆ μ−1
¢
; conditional
on these new estimated factors, updated estimates of Λ, Ξ and D()
can be obtained by OLS from (3).
This procedure is then iterated until convergence. Once the ﬁnal estimate
of G is available, the Ψ() matrix is obtained by applying OLS to (2);
moreover the estimate of the Φ() matrix is obtained by applying OLS to
(1). Finally, the restricted VAR coeﬃcients in (6) are obtained by employing
the ﬁnal estimates of Λ, Ξ and D().
Although a formal proof is beyond the scope of this paper, it is conjec-
tured that, based on the plug-in principle, the above estimation procedure
should lead, at least, to consistent estimation of the parameters and quanti-
ties of interest. In fact, the procedure is based on the use of consistent and
asymptotically normal estimators, as recent theoretical results also validate
the use of PCA in the case of weakly dependent processes (Bai 2003)5,a n d
the OLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal in the framework
considered. This is also coherent with recent work by Pesaran and Chudik
4The sub-set strategy adopted here is preferable to the whole-set strategy (which uses all
available variables) as it can make it easier to give an economic content to the factors, also
avoiding contamination from series potentially unrelated to the phenomenon of interest.
See Bagliano and Morana (2009) for additional details.
5Bai (2003) established consistency and asymptotic normality of PCA when both the
unobserved factors and the idiosyncratic components show limited serial correlation, and
the latter also display heteroschedasticity in both their time-series and cross-sectional
dimensions.
9(2010) on high dimensional VARs with dominant unit. Moreover, albeit
multi-step, the above procedure is iterated to improve eﬃciency.6
3 The data
We use seasonally adjusted quarterly macroeconomic time series data for the
US and 30 advanced economies (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Ice-
land, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Taiwan, United Kingdom), 5 advanced emerging economies
(Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, Poland, South Africa), and 14 secondary emerging
economies (Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey), for a total
of 50 countries.7
For the US, our dataset includes real GDP, civilian employment, real pri-
vate consumption, real private investment, ﬁscal deﬁcit to GDP, current ac-
count deﬁcit to GDP, CPI all items index, the three-month Treasury Bills real
rate, the 10-year Federal government securities real rate, real house prices,
the real eﬀective exchange rate, and real share prices (S&P500). Some addi-
tional ﬁnancial variables have also been included, in order to capture ﬁnancial
distress (the TED spread, the AGENCY spread and the BAA-AAA corpo-
rate spread8) and liquidity conditions (the M2 to GDP ratio, and the total
6In the recent literature, several other approaches to global macroeconometric model
estimation have been proposed. See Bagliano and Morana (2008) for a comparative dis-
cussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the procedure implemented here.
7US data are from FRED2 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis); OECD countries data
are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators,i n t e g r a t e dw i t ht h eI M FInternational
Financial Statistics (bank loans series); data for the other countries are from the IMF
International Financial Statistics; house price series for OECD countries are taken from a
non oﬃcial OECD database (see http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2006doc.nsf/linkto/ECO-
WKP282006293). The authors are grateful to P. Donati, S. Ejerskov, P. Benczur, M.
Jensen for help in collecting some of the series.
8The TED spread is the spread between the 3-month LIBOR rate (Euro-dollar deposit
rate) and the yield on 3-month Treasury bills. Being the diﬀerence between an unsecured
deposit rate and the risk-free rate, it can be taken as a measure of credit/liquidity risk.
The Agency spread is the spread between agency (Freddie Mae, Fannie Mac) 30-year
bonds and 30-year Treasury bonds, capturing the stress in the mortgage market. Finally,
the BAA-AAA spread is the spread between corporate BAA and AAA bonds. In addition
to being a measure of corporate default risk, it is also a measure of risk-taking, as a
contraction of the spread implies an increase in the demand for riskier bonds relative to
safer ones.
10loans and leases at commercial banks to GDP ratio). The time span of the
US data is from 1980:1 to 2009:1, for a total of 117 observations.
Diﬀerently, a smaller set of variables has been considered for the other
countries and collected in the Y vector. Due to data availability, non-US
countries have been partitioned into two groups. The ﬁrst group is com-
posed of the 16 largest OECD economies (Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK). For each of these
countries 6 macroeconomic variables have been considered, including real
GDP, the CPI-all items index, real bank loans to the private sector relative
to GDP, real short-term interest rate (either a 3-month interbank rate or a
3-month Treasury Bills rate, depending on availability), and real house and
stock prices. As for the US, the sample period runs from 1980:1 to 2009:1.
The second group is composed of both advanced and emerging countries, for
a total of 33 countries, including few European (OECD) economies (Aus-
tria, Belgium, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Portugal), some Asian coun-
tries (Russia from Northern Asia, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South
Korea from Eastern Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand from Southeastern Asia, India and Pakistan from Southern Asia,
and Israel and Turkey from Western Asia), some Latin American countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru), some emerging Eu-
ropean countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slove-
nia); and one Northern (Morocco) and one Southern Africa countries (South
Africa). Diﬀerently from the former group, only 5 macroeconomic variables
have been considered for these economies, omitting the house price series,
and a shorter sample period, 1995:1 through 2009:1, is employed. Despite
the relatively small sample (56 observations) our parsimonious speciﬁcation
and (simulation-based) estimation strategy should grant reliability to the
results.
The vector of (observed) common factors F,a ﬀecting both the US and
non-US economies, includes crude oil price and primary commodities (ex-
cluding energy) price shocks, constructed following the procedure set out
by Hamilton (1996).9 Working with shock variables rather than with ac-
tual oil and commodity price series yields some advantages. First, it al-
lows to account for the nonlinearity coming from the asymmetric impact of
9In Hamilton (1996), the oil shock is measured by the maximum of (a) zero and (b)
the diﬀerence between the log-level of the series for the current quarter and the maximum
value of the log value of the series in the previous four quarters. Hence, in order to be
considered, an oil price increase needs to be large enough to oﬀ-set any decrease occurred
over the previous year. This procedure is applied here both to oil prices and to a (ex-
energy) primary commodities price index.
11oil/commodity price shocks, with only negative shocks, i.e. price increases,
aﬀecting real activity. Second, it allows to account for the potential endo-
geneity problems of oil and commodity prices, which may be relevant for the
largest economies in the sample, i.e. the US, China and the Euro Area. By
graphical inspection, it can be concluded that the computed shock variables
are consistent with two major episodes, which may be either associated with
pure supply phenomena (the Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990), or
with speculative or non-US demand (emerging Asia) developments. Hence,
modelling oil and commodity shocks as exogenous may be appropriate given
t h es a m p l ec o n s i d e r e da n dt h es c o p eo ft h ep a p e r .
3.1 Persistence properties
The persistence properties of the data have been assessed by means of the
KPSS stationarity test, in the standard form (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), as
well as by allowing for a non linear trend under the null (Becker et al., 2006),
in order to account for structural change. In the latter test the deterministic
component  is modelled by means of the Gallant (1984) ﬂexible functional
form, whereby  = 0 +1 +2 sin(2)+3 cos(2),c a p t u r i n gn o t
only various forms of non linear smooth deterministic trends, but also being
able to account for the presence of sharp breaks.
The tests have been carried out directly on the series used in the empirical
analysis, i.e. growth rates for employment (denoted by )a n dr e a lG D P( )
and its components, i.e. private consumption ()a n di n v e s t m e n t( ); the
rate of CPI inﬂation (); rates of growth for real house prices (), the real
eﬀe c t i v ee x c h a n g er a t e( ), real stock prices (), as well as for excess real
credit growth () (i.e. the spread between real liquidity growth and real
GDP growth); the levels of the long-term and short-term real interest rates
( and , respectively), the US current account to GDP ratio (), the US
public deﬁcit to GDP ratio (), and the rate of change of two variables
(discussed below) capturing ﬁnancial fragility () and excess liquidity ()
in the US.
The KPSS test is supportive of the selected stationary speciﬁcation, point-
ing to I(0) stationarity for all series. Yet, particularly for inﬂation rates, and
for most of the countries, stationarity seems to occur around the non-linear
deterministic speciﬁcation employed, favoring the inclusion of the latter in
the model.10 These ﬁndings are consistent with previous results of Bagliano
and Morana (2009) and Beltratti and Morana (2010), though for a smaller
10Detailed results are not included for reasons of space, but are available from the
authors upon request.
12set of countries and a shorter sample, and may be rationalized in terms of
successful long-term monetary policy management. Thus, on the basis of the
above results, the stationary representation of the F-VAR model has been
augmented by including the Gallant (1984) speciﬁcation for the deterministic
component.
4 Model speciﬁcation and estimation
To reach the ﬁnal speciﬁcation for the vector of US variables, X,P C Ah a s
been applied to sub-sets of the US series in order to determine whether diﬀer-
ent variables provide similar information that could be suitably summarized
by common components, whereby avoiding potential multicollinearity prob-
lems. In particular, a common component, explaining about 80% of variabil-
ity for each series, can be extracted from the BAA-AAA, AGENCY and TED
spreads. Hence, only the ﬁrst principal component extracted from those se-
ries has been retained, and interpreted as a ﬁnancial fragility index ()f o r
t h eU Se c o n o m y .F i g u r e1 ( a )p o r t r a y st h eb e h a v i o ro ft h et h r e es p r e a d sa n d
the constructed index over the estimation sample, showing two major peaks
at the beginning of the 1980s and in 2008. Similarly, as a single component
explains about 80% of the variability of excess M2 and bank loans (relative to
GDP) growth, only their ﬁrst principal component, interpreted as an excess
liquidity index (), has been included in the vector of US variables rather
than the actual series.11 This index, displayed in Figure 1(b), captures the
gradual build-up of liquidity that started around 1995 and accelerated over
the period 2006-2008. Although other factors could likely be extracted from
the set of US variables, i.e. a common real interest rate component from
the short- and long-term real interest rates and a real activity factor from
output, consumption and investment, in order to fully gauge the interactions
among US variables, consistent with the aim of this study, the actual series
have been employed.
Therefore, the US vector X includes 14 variables, in the following order:
employment growth, real GDP growth, the federal deﬁcit/GDP ratio, real
private consumption growth, real private investment growth, the current ac-
count/GDP ratio, the CPI inﬂation rate, the excess liquidity index, the real
three-month Treasury bills rate, the real ten-year Government Bonds rate,
real house price returns, real eﬀective exchange rate returns, real stock price
returns, and the ﬁnancial fragility index. The rationale for the chosen order-
ing is based on the variables’ speed of adjustment to shocks, with a distinction
11Detailed results are available upon request from the authors.
13between relatively slow-moving variables (mainly related to real activity, or-
dered ﬁrst) and fast-moving variables (notably ﬁnancial quantities, ordered
last).
Diﬀerently, a smaller set of variables is included in the Y vector for the
non-US countries, namely real GDP growth, CPI inﬂation, real excess credit
growth, the real short-term rate, real house price returns (when available),
and real stock price returns, in that order. For parsimony reasons, only ﬁve
lagged US variables (real GDP growth, the excess liquidity index, real house
price returns, real stock price returns and the economic/ﬁnancial fragility
index) are included in the equations for the non-US series.
Concerning the non-US factors, a single common component has been
included in the G vector, extracted from the GDP growth series of the 37
countries for which data are available since 1980:1,12 and capturing common
movements in the (non-US) level of world economic activity. This compo-
nent accounts for about 20% of total variance, with sizable diﬀerences in
the proportion of GDP growth variance explained for each country, ranging
from about 55% for Denmark to less than 1% for Indonesia.13 Figure 1(c)
portrays the (standardized) non-US common GDP growth factor and the US
GDP growth rate over the sample, and shows a sizable positive correlation
(0.43) between the two series. Consistent with the procedure detailed in the
methodological section, this component has been employed in the implemen-
tation of the ﬁrst step of the iterative estimation procedure.
Finally, as already mentioned in the preceding section, Hamilton’s (1996)
shocks to oil price and (non-oil) primary commodities index have been in-
cluded in the F vector.
4.1 The F-VAR model: estimation
On the basis of the BIC information criterion, the optimal lag length of the
F-VAR system is set equal to one. Then, consistently with the Granger and
Jeon (2004) thick modelling approach, up to three lags are considered in
estimation, and median estimates for the parameters of interest are obtained
through simulation (with 1000 replications).
The whole estimated system counts 278 equations. In particular, the 14
12This list includes the largest 18 OECD countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the
UK, Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand), and a selection of the Latin American
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru), Asian countries (China,
Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, India,
Pakistan, Turkey) and African countries (Morocco, South Africa).
13Detailed results are available upon request from the authors.
14equations corresponding to the US block X contain a minimum (maximum)
of 21 (65) parameters, of which 14 (52) are for the lagged US series, 3 (9)
for the lagged F and G series, and 4 are for the deterministic component
(including a constant, a linear trend and two trigonometric components, as
described in data section). The vector X collects the 14 US endogenous
macroeconomic variables (namely  ,    and
, in this order).
Assuming an own-variable block diagonal structure for the correspond-
ing elements of the D() matrix for the foreign countries, i.e. a diagonal
D() as in (5), the block of equations for the 16 largest OECD countries
counts a total of 96 equations, each containing a minimum (maximum) of
13 (31) parameters, of which 1 (3) for the lagged own variable, 5 (15) are
for the lagged US series, 3 (9) for the lagged F and G series, and 4 for
the deterministic component. For each of the 16 above countries the vector
Y collects 6 endogenous macroeconomic variables (namely and
, in this order). The block of equations corresponding to the remaining
33 countries, counts a total of 165 equations, with similar speciﬁcation. For
each of the latter 33 countries the vector Y collects 5 endogenous variables
(namely   and , in this order). Finally, the last 3 equations describe
the dynamics of the common factors (oil and commodities price shocks) and
the non-US common GDP growth factor.
5 C r i s i sd y n a m i c si nt h eU S
In this section, the estimated F-VAR model is used to explore the economic
mechanisms that transmit various shocks hitting the US economy to a large
set of domestic variables (collected in X), in order to gain valuable insights
on the complex interactions of economic and ﬁnancial factors determining the
dynamics of the current “Great Recession” episode. In particular, the im-
pulse response functions obtained from the econometric model are analyzed
to assess the coherence of the mechanics uncovered with the boom-bust credit
cycle hypothesis. Operationally, the identiﬁcation of the structural shocks
has been achieved by means of a Choleski procedure (described in the Appen-
dix) based on the variables’ speed of adjustment to shocks, with a distinction
between relatively slow-moving variables (mainly related to real activity, or-
dered ﬁrst) and fast-moving variables (notably ﬁnancial quantities, ordered
last).
Concerning the slow-moving variables, the economic rationale behind the
assumed recursive structure (going from employment to GDP growth, the
public deﬁcit to GDP ratio, consumption and investment growth, the cur-
15rent account to GDP ratio, and inﬂation), lies on the assumption that, over
the business cycle, real activity is contemporaneously determined by employ-
ment (through a short-run production function), with the latter adjusting
to the phase of the cycle only with (one-quarter) delay. Moreover, output
contemporaneously determines private consumption (consumption function),
investment (investment function) and net import, while the ﬁscal stance is
adjusted according to output dynamics; private consumption and investment
contemporaneously adjust to changes in the ﬁscal stance (either anticipating
future output growth or due to Barro-Ricardo and/or crowding out eﬀects),
and net import is contemporaneously determined by the state of domestic
demand; aggregate demand then feedbacks, with a (one-quarter) delay, to ag-
gregate supply, and prices adjust according to aggregate demand and supply
interactions.
On the other hand, concerning the fast-moving variables, the assumed
ordering (going from excess liquidity to real short- and long-run interest
rates, real house prices, the real exchange rate, real stock prices, and the
ﬁnancial fragility index) implies that liquidity conditions contemporaneously
determine interest rates and asset prices, while liquidity may respond to as-
set prices developments only with a (one-quarter) delay. This is consistent
with asset prices rapidly adjusting to the stance of monetary policy, with the
Fed at most implementing a leaning-against-the-wind strategy, relatively to
asset price dynamics; hence, the real short-term rate is contemporaneously
determined by liquidity conditions, while the real long-term rate is contem-
poraneously determined by the real short-term rate. Real house prices and
the real eﬀective exchange rate are contemporaneously determined by liquid-
ity conditions and interest rates, while real stock prices contemporaneously
react to any change in the economy. Finally, the ﬁnancial fragility index
embeds all contemporaneous information on the state of the business cycle.
Note also that the slow- to fast-moving ordering implies that monetary pol-
icy, the key determinant of liquidity and interest rates in the economy, is set
according to the state of the business cycle.
Median forecast error variance decomposition and cumulated impulse re-
sponses to unitary shocks, with 90% signiﬁc a n c eb a n d s ,h a v eb e e nc o m p u t e d
up to a horizon of three years, to show the dynamic reaction of the level of
investigated variables.14 We start with a presentation of the result delivered
by the forecast error variance decomposition analysis. As the Choleski ap-
proach may lead to policy conclusions which are not robust to the ordering of
the variables, due to the contemporaneous correlation of their reduced form
14Only selected results have been reported for reasons of space. A full set of results is
available upon request from the authors.
16disturbances, we discuss some robustness issues at the end of the section.
5.1 Forecast error variance decomposition
According to the results of the forecast error variance decomposition reported
in Table 1, the overall picture is fairly consistent with standard macroeco-
nomic theory. In particular, demand side shocks are more relevant for real
activity than supply side (productivity) disturbances in the short-term and
the latter gain importance over a medium-term horizon, private consump-
tion shows quicker adjustments than investment, and ﬁnancial shocks are
more relevant for real activity ﬂuctuations in the medium-term than in the
short-term. Moreover, ﬂuctuations in ﬁnancial variables may be determined
by both fundamentals (ultimately driven by consumption and productivity
shocks) and purely speculative factors, with stock prices showing a larger
speculative component than bond and house prices. Close interrelationships
among ﬁnancial assets are also detected, with the short-term interest rate
being relevant for ﬁnancial fragility and house price ﬂuctuations, as well as
excess liquidity dynamics. Hence, the overall picture appears to be consistent
with a boom-bust credit cycle scenario, where ﬁnancial factors are the trig-
gering mechanism of the downturn in real activity and worsened economic
conditions feedback to asset prices, starting a cumulative process. A selection
of the most relevant results is presented in detail below.
5.1.1 Real side ﬂuctuations in the US
Fluctuations in US real activity are mostly determined by real side shocks
in the short-term, while ﬁnancial factors may have some role in the medium-
term. In fact, in the short-term, real output responds only to the own (ag-
gregate demand) (68%), employment (23%) and inﬂation (aggregate sup-
ply/productivity) (5%) shocks; rather, in the medium-term the aggregate
demand (44%) and employment (11%) disturbances loose somewhat impor-
tance, while the aggregate supply (12%) and the short-term real interest rate
shock (18%) become more relevant.15 A coherent pattern can be detected
for consumption and investment as well, with the employment and aggregate
demand shocks having sizable eﬀects at all forecasting horizons for both vari-
ables (13% to 30%), while the house price (7% to 8%), the current account
deﬁcit (13%), the ﬁnancial fragility index (on consumption, 7%) and the real
short-term rate (on investment, 21%) disturbances play a larger role in the
15The economic interpretation of the shocks is discussed in the subsequant section on
impulse response analysis.
17medium-term. Finally, employment is strongly idiosyncratic, with the aggre-
gate supply, aggregate demand and real short-term rate shocks contributing
somewhat to ﬂuctuations only at the three-year horizon (8%, 13% and 17%,
respectively).
5.1.2 Financial ﬂuctuations in the US
Concerning asset price volatility, a relevant role is played by consumption
and productivity shocks, at all horizons. For instance, the contribution of
the consumption shock to ﬂuctuations of real short- and long-term rates
is always sizable (15% to 21%), while the productivity shock is actually
dominant (40% to 54%); similarly for house prices (12% to 29%) and eco-
nomic/ﬁnancial fragility conditions (productivity, 14% to 22%; consumption,
7% in the medium-term); for stock prices, as well as excess liquidity, some-
what less (productivity, 5% to 9%; consumption, 4% to 11% ); for the latter
variable also the aggregate demand shock plays an important role (14% to
38%).
Yet, other disturbances also matter, albeit to a lower extent: the pub-
lic deﬁcit shock is relevant for interest rates (4% to 7%), stock prices (6%
in the very short-term), and economic and ﬁnancial fragility conditions (4%
in the medium-term); the current account deﬁcit shock matters for stock
prices (11% to 20%) and excess liquidity (20% in the medium-term); em-
ployment disturbances are relevant for the short-term rate (7%), as well as
for economic/ﬁnancial fragility in the medium-term (7%); ﬁnally, the short-
term interest rate is important for ﬁnancial fragility conditions (9% to 17%),
house prices (11% in the medium-term), and the long-term rate (medium-
term, 5%).
5.1.3 Fluctuations in US domestic and foreign debt
Both the ﬁscal deﬁcit/GDP ratio and the current account deﬁcit/GDP ratio
are strongly idiosyncratic at the two-quarter horizon (80% and 88%, respec-
tively), but somewhat less in the medium-term, as employment, house prices,
productivity and interest rate shocks play some role. For instance, ﬁgures
for medium-term ﬂuctuations in the ﬁscal deﬁcit/GDP ratio are 5% to 7%
for employment, house price and real short-term rate shocks; similar ﬁg-
ures are found for the current account deﬁcit/GDP ratio, i.e. about 5% for
the aggregate demand, house price and productivity shocks, while short- and
long-term rates disturbances have a more sizable eﬀect (13% to 16%). Hence,
our results point to a much weaker role of stock and house prices in deter-
mining US current account deﬁcit ﬂuctuations than found by Fratzscher et
18al. (2009).
5.2 Impulse response analysis
Concerning the mechanics of the crisis, the results of the impulse response
analysis allow to draw relatively clear-cut conclusions. Table 2 reports the
median cumulated responses of the US variables to unitary shocks over a
two-quarter, one-year and three year-horizons; signiﬁcant ﬁgures at the 10%
level, are shown in bold.
5.2.1 Financial linkages
According to a boom-bust credit cycle interpretation of the crisis, asset prices
misalignments in the housing and stock markets are initially fuelled by the
availability of excess liquidity and low interest rates. As shown in Table
2, no signiﬁcant connection can be detected between excess liquidity shock
and house and stock prices, though the point medium-term impact on stock
prices is sizable (0.15%). Yet, following a positive shock to excess liquidity,
the short- and long-term rates decrease (by 14 basis points), with a temporary
contraction in the real short-term interest rate then leading to a signiﬁcant
increase in house (0.6% in the medium-term) and stock prices (0.9% in the
very short-term).
Diﬀerent economic mechanisms can explain the correlations between asset
prices, interest rates and liquidity, providing a causal interpretation of the
observed linkages. Portfolio rebalancing would predict a positive relationship
between excess liquidity and asset prices, as the increased liquidity would be
allocated to the various assets, increasing their demand and price; moreover,
from the present value model, a reduction in the interest rate leads to lower
discounting of the ﬂow of expected future dividends (rents), increasing stock
(house) prices; ﬁnally, a contraction in the mortgage rate can ease liquidity
constraints, boosting housing demand and prices (Alm and Follain, 1984).
Other linkages may also operate, as higher asset prices may boost the value
of ﬁrms’ collateral, increasing their borrowing ability, and at the same time
improving the balance sheets of ﬁnancial institutions and increasing leverage.
Financial accelerator mechanisms may also amplify the above eﬀects, fuelling
an asset price-balance-sheet-credit spiral. The signiﬁcance of feedback eﬀects
from stock prices to liquidity becomes apparent if, rather than focusing on
excess liquidity, just liquidity ()i sc o n s i d e r e d .A s = −, the response
of liquidity to a stock prices increase can be obtained as  = +, yielding
0.05%, 0.36% and 0.83% at the 2-, 4- and 12-quarter horizons, respectively.
19Concerning the generation of excess liquidity, a potential role can ﬁnally
be ascribed to the current account deﬁcit, consistent with the view that huge
US trade deﬁcits contributed to the boom phase of the credit cycle, fostering
growth of global liquidity and further debt accumulation. As reported in
T a b l e2 ,a ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec u r r e n ta c c o u n td e ﬁcit/GDP ratio leads in fact
to a sizable increase in excess liquidity (0.4%) and depreciation of the real
exchange rate (-0.84%), with a negative medium-term impact on real activity
(consumption, -0.3%; investment, -0.8%) and stock prices (-2.7%).16
The setting-in of the bust phase of the current crisis might have followed
expected, but not materialized, house price appreciation, which would have
lead the predatory lending mechanism to break down and to a generalized
decline in asset prices and tight credit conditions, as ﬁnancial institutions
were forced into deleveraging and recapitalization. While our empirical evi-
dence on the asset prices-balance-sheet-credit spiral is weak, the positive and
signiﬁcant correlation between house and stock prices may indeed be use-
ful to describe the eﬀects of the deleveraging process, with a negative house
price shock leading to a contraction in stock prices (-1.3%) in the short-term
(ﬂexible adjustment), and a negative stock price disturbance leading to a con-
traction in house prices (-0.3%) in the medium-term (sluggish adjustment).
Yet, the correlation is also consistent with a portfolio model where prices
depend on net inﬂows. Then, a change in wealth determined by a contrac-
tion in house (stock) prices would lead agents to rebalance their portfolios
by selling stocks (housing) as well (see Beltratti and Morana 2010 for similar
ﬁndings).
5.2.2 Real eﬀects of the crisis
Concerning the real eﬀects of the crisis, diﬀerent theoretical relationships can
be envisaged between asset prices and credit conditions and real activity.
First, tight credit conditions may constrain consumption and investment
expenditure (Gauger and Snyder, 2003; Leamer, 2007; Greenlaw et al., 2008;
Dell’Ariccia et al., 2008; Bayoumi and Mellander, 2008; Goodhart and Hoﬀ-
man, 2008; Schularick and Taylor, 2009). Our empirical evidence is not
clear-cut on this issue, pointing to a positive correlation between excess liq-
uidity and employment (0.02%), as well as to a negative correlation between
excess liquidity and investment (-0.11%) in the very short-term.
Second, falling asset prices may aﬀect real activity also through wealth
16According to Jagannathan et al. (2009), behind US trade dynamics there would
however be inadequate ﬁnancial markets, preventing higher levels of domestic consumption
and investment in emerging economies, as well as currency controls, motivated by export-
led growth objectives, particularly in China.
20eﬀects on consumption and Tobin’s “q” eﬀects on investment. According to
the life-cycle model, a permanent increase in housing wealth leads in fact to
an increase in spending and borrowing by homeowners, as they try to smooth
consumption over the life cycle. The increase in property value actually en-
ables them to borrow more as it increases the value of collateral. Additional
eﬀects can be expected through Tobin’s “q” eﬀects, as an increase in house
prices determines an increase in property value over construction costs, stim-
ulating residential investment. Our empirical evidence is fairly consistent
with the above channels. A negative house price shock does indeed lead to
as i g n i ﬁcant contraction in consumption (up to -0.2%) and investment (up
t o- 0 . 6 % ) ,a sw e l la si no u t p u ta n de m p l o y m e n ti nt h es h o r t - t e r m . S i m i -
lar evidence is found for a negative stock price disturbance, though with a
weaker impact (-02.% and -0.1% for consumption and investment, respec-
tively). Overall, the ﬁndings are consistent with previous evidence in the
literature, pointing to an inelastic impact of asset prices on real activity, and
stronger for house prices than for stock prices (Beltratti and Morana, 2010;
Bagliano and Morana, 2008; Case et al., 2005; Chirinko et al., 2004; Carrol
et al., 2006).
Finally, while the credit boom phase occurred in an environment of low
inﬂation, a deﬂation risk was actually perceived after the bust. From Table
2 a linkage between asset price busts and inﬂation can be established, with
a negative house price shock leading to a signiﬁcant contraction in consumer
prices in the short-term (-0.12%).
5.2.3 Feedbacks from the real to the ﬁnancial side
Second-round eﬀects from the downturn in real activity on asset prices can
also be expected. The empirical evidence is not fully clear-cut, as a negative
aggregate demand shock17 leads to a (not signiﬁcant) contraction in house
prices in the medium-term and in stock prices at all horizons (signiﬁcant
only in the short-term). On the other hand, a stronger impact is attribut-
able to the aggregate supply (productivity) shock18,w h i c hi ss i g n i ﬁcant at
17The output shock, due to the positive short-term median correlation with inﬂation
and interest rate, is interpreted in terms of aggregate demand shock.
18The inﬂation shock, in our framework, as in Bagliano and Morana (2009), may bear
the interpretation of productivity shock. The argument follows from the fact that the
structural inﬂation shock is estimated from dynamics around the non linear deterministic
trend, which can be related to the disinﬂationary policy carried out by the Fed over
the 1980s, and the successful inﬂation control thereafter, i.e. to long-term monetary
policy management. The proposed interpretation is consistent with the results in Table
2, showing that a negative productivity shock (positive inﬂation shock) would lead to an
increase in the price level and a contraction in output, as well as with Gordon (2005),
21any horizon, with a 1% medium-term output contraction, following a neg-
ative productivity shock, being associated with a 2.5% reduction in house
prices and with a 8% contraction in stock prices over the same horizon. A
present value model, relating future developments in dividends and rents to
output dynamics, could account for the observed features, as a negative pro-
ductivity shock (positive inﬂation shock), by decreasing dividends and rents,
and increasing the discount factor (due to the inﬂation component in nominal
interest rates), would lead to a contraction in asset prices.19
5.2.4 The role of external demand
From the US the crisis has quickly spread to the other economies. Hence,
second-round eﬀects may be expected through external demand. As shown
in Table 2, a foreign output contraction has a negative and signiﬁcant impact
on US real activity (0.10% reduction in output in the short-term) and em-
ployment (up to 0.07%), leading to a short-term increase in the ﬁscal deﬁcit
(0.04%) and excess liquidity (0.13%), and to an improvement in the current
account (-0.07%). Moreover, a short-term contraction in consumer prices (-
0.05%), as well as in stock prices (-4.5%), is observed. Hence, second-round
eﬀects should not be neglected when assessing the real costs of the ﬁnancial
crisis for the US economy.20
pointing to an important role of productivity growth for US inﬂation dynamics.
19The identiﬁcation of global (US) aggregate demand and supply shocks, as well as of a
monetary policy shock related to the short-term rate management by the Fed, is consistent
with the results of Dees et al. (2010), also implementing a multi-country macroeconometric
moodel. Yet, in terms of the size of the shocks our results are not fully comparable with
those of Dees et al. (2010), as rather than using cyclical deviations from trends, actual
rates of growth and returns are employed in the current study. It is however worthwhile
mentioning that, considering the 1-year horizon, a 20 b.p. increase in the US real short-
term rate would lead to a contraction in US real output of similar size, i.e. about -0.4%
(relative to trend) in Dees et al. (2010) and -0.3% with our approach. Moreover, a
positive aggregate demand shock, leading to a 3% increase in US GDP (relative to trend)
would lead the nominal US short-term rate to increase of about 80 b.p. (relatively to
trend) in Dees et al. (2010) and of about 60 b.p. with our approach. Figures concerning
the aggregate supply shock are, on the other hand, somewhat diﬀerent, with a negative
aggregate supply shock, leading to a 1% increase in the US price level, being associated
with a -2.% contraction in real output (relative to trend) in Dees et al. (2010), but only
with a -0.5% decrease with our approach.
20The empircal relevance of feedback eﬀects from the world (non-US driven) business
cycle to the US business cycle is not inconsistent with the fact that the US is a major driver
in world output ﬂuctuations. In fact, albeit being a net importer, the US is still one of the
world top exporters in machinery and equipment, industrial supplies, non-auto consumer
goods, motor vehicles, aircraft, food, feed and beverages. Its main export partners are
Canada, the European Union, Mexico, China and Japan.
225.2.5 The eﬀects of economic policy
A st h ec r i s i sw a su n f o l d ing, an expansionary ﬁscal/monetary policy mix was
implemented,21 in order to contrast its eﬀects on real activity and ensuring
the survival of the ﬁnancial system. From Table 2 it can be noted that a neg-
ative aggregate demand shock would in fact lead to a signiﬁcant short-term
increase in excess liquidity (0.4%), as well as to contraction in the short-term
real interest rate (by 10 basis points) in the short-term. Similar dynamics
are also observed in the aftermath of a negative employment shock, which
also triggers an expansionary ﬁscal policy in the very short-term. Similarly,
the implementation of an expansionary ﬁscal policy would also be triggered
by a positive shock to the ﬁnancial fragility index (i.e. an increase in liq-
uidity/credit risk, corporate risk/risk appetite, stress in the mortgage mar-
ket), to which a positive response of real activity (consumption, 0.2%) may
be associated, as well as an improvement in stock (0.3%) and house prices
(0.2%). The eﬀectiveness of the expansionary ﬁscal policy is also supported
by the signiﬁcant medium-term expansion of output (0.2%) and employment
(0.1%), following a positive ﬁscal deﬁcit shock. The presence of idle resources
in the economy, i.e. unemployed labour and underutilized capital, liquidity
constraints and low interest rates, which can make crowding out eﬀects on
private spending negligible, may explain the ﬁndings. A signiﬁcant expan-
sionary impact on output (0.3%) and real activity, as well as on house (0.6%)
and stock prices (0.9% in the short-term), is also triggered by a short-term
rate cut, pointing to the eﬀectiveness of an expansionary monetary policy
implemented through the standard interest rate channel. Overall, our ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with Almunia et al. (2009), pointing to the eﬀectiveness
of ﬁscal and monetary policies during the Great Depression, where macro-
economic conditions were close to those currently prevailing in the major
world economies, as well as with Buiter (2009), pointing to the eﬀectiveness
of interest rate policies, while quantitative and credit easing strategies would
have failed at avoiding credit crunch eﬀects.
21Surely peculiar to the current crisis is the rescue plan launched by the US govern-
ment, i.e. the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP), which has taken various forms
of liquidity injection and debt relief programmes, aiming at defreezing the interbank and
repo markets, and easing the banking sector from the burden of the unperforming loans,
as well as to facilitate its recapitalization, even through its partial nationalization (capital
injection through purchase of equity by the government). At the same time the Fed has
implemented both conventional interest rate policies, as well as less conventional quantita-
tive and credit easing strategies in order to ensure the provision of liquidity in the banking
sector and in the overall economy. See Reis (2009) for an accurate account of the policies
implemented by the Fed during the crisis.
235.2.6 The contribution of adverse supply shocks
The response of the macroeconomy to oil and commodity price shocks is
consistent with expectations. In fact, an oil price hike has a “stagﬂationary”
eﬀect, leading to a contraction in real activity (-0.8%) and employment (-
0.5%) in the medium-term, and to an increase in the general price level
(1.1%). Accommodation of the shock is observed, with sizable interest rates
cuts (by 286 basis points), in the face of falling asset prices (-3.6% and -18%
for house and stock prices, respectively). The current account deﬁcit also
worsens in the short-term, consistently with the increased oil price. Similar
dynamics is observed also for commodity prices.
5.2.7 Determinants of economic and ﬁnancial fragility
Finally, concerning the ﬁnancial fragility index, some interesting conclusions
can be drawn from its response to various structural shocks. First, negative
productivity and negative aggregate demand disturbances lead to a signiﬁ-
cant increase in fragility in the short-term. Sizable and signiﬁcant positive
short-term impacts on fragility can also be associated with a short-term rate
increase and oil and commodity price hikes. Finally, a positive excess liq-
uidity shock would also lead to an increase in the ﬁnancial fragility index in
the short-term. Hence, the latter variable may be retained as a summary
measure of incoming ﬁnancial stress, complementary to the observation of
house and stock price dynamics. Yet, it is worthwhile noting that the ﬁ-
nancial fragility index used in this paper shares some of the properties of
the leading indicator for an incoming bust phase proposed by Borio (2008),
which exploits the joint occurrence of rapid credit growth and higher risk
taking, but not increasing asset prices.
5.3 Robustness issues
The chosen ordering of the US variables is based on two main assumptions:
(i) supply-side disturbances have a contemporaneous eﬀe c to na g g r e g a t ed e -
mand components, while demand feedbacks to supply with a (one-quarter)
delay; (ii) liquidity conditions determine contemporaneously the short-term
real interest rate, while the latter feedbacks to liquidity conditions only with
a (one-quarter) delay. In order to assess the robustness of the policy conclu-
sions drawn in this Section to the above assumptions, the analysis has been
repeated for a diﬀerent ordering the variables, inverting the contemporane-
ous role of supply and demand, and liquidity and the short-term rate. In
particular, for the slow-moving variables the following alternative ordering
24is considered: consumption, investment, public deﬁcit to GDP ratio, cur-
rent account deﬁcit to GDP ratio, output, employment and inﬂation; on the
other hand, for the fast-moving variables the alternative ordering is: real
short-term interest rate, excess liquidity, real long-term interest rate, real
house prices, real eﬀective exchange rate, real stock prices and the ﬁnancial
fragility index.
As shown in Table 1A in the Appendix, the results of the impulse re-
sponse analysis are remarkably robust to the ordering reversal considered,
as no major changes concerning median responses can in general be noted.
There are however two interesting diﬀerences between the results reported
in Table 2 and in Table 1A, which is worthwhile mentioning. Firstly, the
median response of real activity to an employment shock, and of domestic
demand to an output/aggregate demand shock, although of the same sign,
is more muted than what found for the original ordering; secondly, the out-
put/aggregate demand shock would seem to be deﬂationary and neutral on
stock prices. Concerning the latter feature, our results show that, for the
modiﬁed ordering, it is the consumption shock (not reported) which should
probably bear the interpretation of aggregated demand shock, positively af-
fecting output, the price level, interest rates and stock prices.
6 Spillovers eﬀects outside the US
Rather than reporting results on a country by country basis, ﬁgures in Ta-
ble 3 refer to descriptive statistics of the cross-country distribution of the
dynamic multipliers, at the 2-quarter (short-term) and 12-quarter (medium-
term) horizons, for selected foreign variables (output, excess credit, house
prices and stock prices), of OECD (+ Israel) and non-OECD economies, fol-
lowing US unitary percentage changes in output, excess liquidity, house and
stock prices, and ﬁnancial fragility.22
22In this study the OECD group includes 32 currently member countries (Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak, Slovenia, Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States) and Israel, which is about to join. The
non-OECD group is then composed of the remaining 17 countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Morocco and South Africa).
256.1 Responses to US output dynamics
A ss h o w ni nT a b l e3 ,c h a n g e si nU SG D Pd y n a m i c sa r eq u i c k l yt r a n s m i t -
ted across both advanced and emerging economies. A unitary percentage
change in US GDP leads in fact to a signiﬁcant increase in median GDP for
both OECD and non OECD countries at both horizons (0.16% and 0.53%,
respectively, in the medium-term).23 By further grouping the countries in
four groups (Tables 4 and 5), i.e. advanced Europe (plus Canada), East-
ern Europe, Asia and Latin America, it is possible to note that the median
medium-term responses for Europe and Eastern Europe are similar to those
found for the OECD group (0.15%), while for Asia and Latin America a
stronger response is observed (0.33% and 0.66%).
O v e r a l l ,t h ee c o n o m i cs l o w d o w ni nt h eU Sm a ybee x pe c t e dt oh a v ep l a y e d
as i g n i ﬁcant and sizable role in the worldwide economic recession, with a
stronger eﬀect for Latin American and Asian countries (South-Eastern Asia,
especially) than for Eastern European and advanced economies, consistent
with international trade linkages and own country growth dynamics.24 These
ﬁndings are consistent with Dooley and Hutchinson (2009) and Levchenko
et al. (2010), reporting a large decline in international trade (about 30%-
40%) during the current crisis, and with Berken et al. (2009), Bems et al.
(2010) and Grossman and Meissner (2010), pointing to the importance of
the trade channel, particularly for countries exporting manufacturing and
durable goods. Interestingly, our evidence actually contrasts with the de-
coupling of advanced and emerging economies business cycles hypothesis,
recently put forward by Kose et al. (2008).
The US economic slowdown is also likely to have played a signiﬁcant
role in determining stock price developments in both advanced and emerging
countries. In fact, Table 3 shows that similar median medium-term responses
of foreign stock prices to US output dynamics is observed for both OECD
(20%) and non-OECD countries (27%). Results for the European group are
23As can be noted in Table 3, in general, the dispersion of the cross-sectional distribution
tends to be larger for non-OECD than OECD countries, revealing stronger commonalities
in economic dynamics for the latter group of economies. Moreover, for both groups of
countries and both horizons, the cross-sectional distribution features asymmetries and
positive excess kurtosis, i.e. a larger number of outlying observations than compatible
with a normal cross-sectional distribution.
24According to US Department of Commerce (http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/ft900.pdf), in 2009 26% of total US imports
was from North America (Canada 14%, Mexico 11%), 21% from Europe (Germany 5%,
UK 3%, France, Italy, Ireland 2% each, 7% other countries), 34% from Paciﬁc Rim coun-
tries (19% China, 6% Japan, 6% NICs, 4% other countries), South America 7%, OPEC
countries 7%, other countries 5%.
26again consistent with what found for the OECD group (22%), while the
Eastern European group shows a more muted reaction (11%); on the other
hand, stronger median responses are found for the Asian (25%) and Latin
American (26%) areas, also consistent with the deeper impact of the US
economic recession on foreign output for the latter groups of countries.
Finally, while for house prices the connection with US GDP dynamics is
negligible, the response of excess credit is sizable and diﬀerent across groups,
i.e. positive for OECD countries (1.6%) and negative for non-OECD coun-
tries (-1.9%), and stronger for Eastern Europe (+2.36%) and Latin America
(-1.65%) than for Europe (1%) and Asia (-0.5%). This pattern is possibly
explained by a diﬀerent monetary policy reaction across the two sub-groups
of countries, being procyclical for OECD economies and countercyclical for
non-OECD countries.
6.2 Responses to US ﬁnancial developments
According to the results reported in Table 3, the eﬀects of US ﬁnancial devel-
opments on foreign output are not fully clear-cut. US stock price dynamics
do not have any relevant eﬀe c to nf o r e i g nG D P ,w h i l eU Sh o u s ep r i c ed y -
namics do exercise some negative eﬀects for the non-OECD group (-0.22% in
the medium-term); yet, a worsening of ﬁnancial fragility conditions in the US
leads to an output contraction for both groups (-0.12%, OECD, short-term; -
0.13%, non OECD, medium-term). Moreover, the sub-group analysis reveals
that US house price dynamics and ﬁnancial fragility conditions are partic-
ularly relevant for Eastern Europe (-0.25% and -0.89%) and Latin America
(-0.30% and -0.60%), leaving almost unaﬀected the European (0.02% and
-0.03%) and Asian (0.04% and -0.1%) groups.
Other interesting conclusions can be drawn for the foreign ﬁnancial vari-
ables. First, US excess liquidity is positively associated with excess credit
for OECD countries at both horizons (0.2% to 0.5%), and house prices in
the medium-term only (0.17%); diﬀerently, the median impact on excess
credit for non-OECD countries is negative (-0.66% in the medium-term).
Consistent results are delivered by the sub-group analysis, pointing to siz-
able medium-term median contractions in excess credit for Eastern Europe
(-2.8%) and Latin America (-1.1%), to a weaker response for Asia (-0.2%),
and to a positive response for Europe (0.5%). Moreover, the eﬀect of an
increase in US excess liquidity on foreign stock prices is sizable and posi-
tive for both groups in the medium-te r m( 5 % ) ,b u tn e g a t i v ef o rn o n - O E C D
countries in the short-term (-6%). Interestingly, the positive medium-term
response found for non-OECD countries concerns Eastern Europe (3.1%) and
Latin America (6.6%) only, as for Asia the response is still negative (-0.9%).
27Also, the short-term negative response for non-OECD economies appears to
be particularly strong for Asia and Latin America (-8%), and much smaller
for Eastern Europe (-1.2%); rather, ﬁg u r e sf o rE u r o p ea r ei nl i n ew i t hw h a t
found for the OECD group (3.2% to 7.3%).
Second, US housing and stock prices do aﬀect foreign ﬁnancial markets
of both group of countries. An increase in US house prices lead to a median
increase in house prices for OECD countries, particularly in the medium-
term (0.8%), and to an increase in stock prices for both OECD (16% to 18%)
and non-OECD economies (9% to 23%); on the other hand, an increase in
US stock prices causes an increase in stock prices in the OECD countries
(0.15% in the short-term), but a contraction in non-OECD stock markets
(-5%). Interestingly, the sub-group analysis reveals that while the positive
eﬀect of a US house price increase on international stock markets is similar in
magnitude across sub-groups, the negative eﬀect of a US stock prices increase
would be larger for Latin American (-9% to -11%) than for Asian and Eastern
European (-2% to -4%) countries.
It may then be concluded that a generous stance in US liquidity might
lead to a rebalancing of international investor portfolios in favor of advanced
and safer ﬁnancial markets; hence, excess liquidity in the US, as well as
buoyant US housing and stock markets, may have contributed to keep mo-
mentum in foreign advanced country stock and housing markets (and to their
depression during the bust phase). Should the trend in liquidity creation be
reversed, it may then be expected that stock markets in advanced economies
would suﬀer more than those in emerging countries, as international investors
appear to switch to emerging countries’ stock markets when the US market
stagnate or is depressed. This is also conﬁr m e db yt h ef a c tt h a taw o r s -
ening of economic and ﬁnancial fragility conditions in the US leads to a
medium-term contraction in house (-0.1%) and stock prices (-5%) in OECD
countries, but to an increase in stock prices in non-OECD economies (14% in
the short-term), particularly in Asia and Latin America (12% and 5%; -26%
for Eastern Europe). Overall, our ﬁndings are only partially consistent with
Galesi and Sgherri (2009). Likewise the latter authors, we do ﬁnd evidence
of transmission of negative US stock price shocks to advanced and emerging
European stock markets in the short-term; yet, we do also ﬁnd that the ef-
fects of US shocks do not fade away in the short-term, still lasting also in the
medium-term.
287 Conclusions
The paper focuses on the current economic and ﬁnancial turmoil, considering
both its dynamics within the US and the spillover to foreign advanced and
emerging economies. Relative to previous work in the literature, the cur-
rent paper innovates for the depth and wideness of the analysis and econo-
metric methodology, providing an accurate investigation of the international
macro/ﬁnance interface. A total of 50 countries, covering advanced and ma-
jor emerging countries, and 278 equations, considering key macroeconomic
and ﬁnancial variables, are in fact investigated by means of a large-scale open
economy macroeconometric model, set in the factor vector autoregressive (F-
VAR) framework and estimated over the 1980-2009 period.
T h em a i nc o n c l u s i o n so ft h ep a p e ra r ea sf o l l o w s .F i r s t ,c o n c e r n i n gt h e
mechanics of the crisis within the US, the empirical results are quite con-
sistent with a boom-bust credit cycle interpretation of the crisis. In fact,
there is evidence that asset prices misalignments in the housing and stock
markets, as well as low real interest rates, over the boom phase of the cycle,
might have been driven by excessively generous liquidity in the system. The
ballooning US trade deﬁcit also likely contributed to the latter dynamics,
as huge capital inﬂows were redirected from the bond and stock markets to
the housing market. Moreover, there is also evidence that the bust phase
of the crisis may have been precipitated by declining house prices and the
consequent breakdown in the predatory lending mechanism. The empirical
evidence does in fact point to a bidirectional linkage relating house and stock
prices, consistent with the generalized decline in asset prices and tight credit
conditions, which resulted from deleveraging and recapitalization of ﬁnancial
institutions. In addition, concerning the real eﬀects of the crisis, stronger
evidence of an assets price channel, working through wealth and Tobin’s “q”
eﬀects, than a liquidity channel, is detected. Also consistent is the related
deﬂation risk, feared during the unwinding of the crisis, given the negative
linkage between asset prices and inﬂa t i o nd e t e c t e di nt h ed a t a . M o r e o v e r ,
concerning the policy reaction to the crisis, the evidence supports the ef-
fectiveness of the implemented expansionary ﬁscal/monetary policy mix, as
deﬁcit creation and real interest rate cuts both lead to a signiﬁcant expansion
in output and employment. Finally, the recession in the US may have been
made worse by the second-round eﬀects determined by weakened external
demand, as foreign output is found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect US real activity, as
well as US house and stock prices.
Second, concerning the spillovers of the crisis to foreign advanced and
emerging economies, the contraction in real economic activity in the US may
have played a sizable role in the slowdown of foreign economic activity, neg-
29atively aﬀecting foreign ﬁnancial markets as well. Interestingly, a stronger
response is found for emerging economies, especially in Latin America and
Asia, than for advanced economies, consistently with international trade link-
ages. On the other hand, adverse US ﬁnancial developments do not seem to
have a clear-cut impact on foreign economic activity. Hence, the trade chan-
nel does seem to be the key transmission mechanism of the US economic
crisis to the rest of the world. Diﬀerently, the US ﬁnancial crisis is likely to
have spread through US house and stock price dynamics, as well as excess
liquidity creation.
30Appendix A: Identiﬁcation of structural dis-
turbances
This Appendix describes the identiﬁcation procedure used to extract struc-
tural disturbances from the reduced-form factor innovations in η and ζ,a n d
from the vector of US-speciﬁc disturbances v
 to investigate the dynamic
eﬀects of various shocks within the US economy, starting from the reduced-




 = H()η + H()ζ + H()v

 (A1)
where H(), H() and H() are the appropriate lag polynomial
sub-matrices of H() in (8). Structural disturbances are obtained by means
of a standard identiﬁcation scheme in structural VAR models based on exclu-
sion restrictions on the contemporaneous (within quarter) responses of the
elements in F, G and X to shocks.
In particular, denoting by ξ the vector of the  structural shocks driving
the common factors in F, the relation between the reduced form and the
structural factor disturbances can be written as ξ = Kη,w h e r eK is a ×
invertible matrix. By assumption the structural factor shocks are orthogonal
and have unit variance, so that  [ξξ
0
]=KΣ K0 = I.T o a c h i e v e e x a c t
identiﬁcation of the structural disturbances, additional (−1)2 restrictions
need to be imposed. Since η = K−1ξ, imposing exclusion restrictions on
the contemporaneous impact matrix amounts to imposing zero restrictions
on the elements of K−1, for which a lower-triangular structure is assumed.
This latter assumption implies a precise “ordering” of the common factors
in F. In particular, the ﬁrst factor is allowed to have a contemporaneous
impact on all other factors, but reacts only with a one-period lag to the
other structural disturbances; instead, the last factor is contemporaneously
aﬀected by all structural shocks, having only lagged eﬀects on all other fac-
tors. Operationally, K−1 (with the ( − 1)2 zero restrictions necessary for
exact identiﬁcation imposed) is estimated by the Choleski decomposition of
the factor innovation variance matrix Σ: ˆ K−1 =chol(ˆ Σ).
A similar procedure is applied to obtain identiﬁcation of the structural
shocks driving the foreign (non-US) factors in G and the US-speciﬁci n -
novations in v
 .D e n o t i n g b y ψ the vector of  structural shocks to the
foreign factors (uncorrelated with the ξ shocks), the relation between the
reduced form and the structural foreign factor disturbances can be written as
ψ = Γζ,w h e r eΓ is a × invertible matrix. In addition to the orthogonal-
ity conditions  [ψψ
0
]=ΓΣ  Γ0 = I, (−1)2 zero restrictions are needed
31for exact identiﬁcation. Similarly, denoting by υ = Θv
 ,w h e r eΘ is a ×
invertible matrix, the -variate vector of US idiosyncratic structural shocks
(uncorrelated with the above structural factor shocks), the identiﬁcation







= ΘΣ  Θ0 = I, ( −1)2 zero restrictions. Since ζ = Γ−1ψ
and v
 = Θ−1υ, the required restrictions are imposed by assuming a lower-
triangular structure for the contemporaneous impact matrices Γ−1 and Θ−1.
Operationally, Γ−1 and Θ−1 are estimated by the Choleski decomposition of
the factor innovation variance matrix Σ and the US idiosyncratic innovation
variance matrix Σ: ˆ Γ−1 = (ˆ Σ) and Θ−1 = (ˆ Σ). The structural




−1 ξ + H()Γ
−1 ψ + H()Θ
−1 υ (A2)
and is used to obtain the impulse response functions of US variables to com-
mon factor, foreign factor and US idiosyncratic structural disturbances.25
In our application, the assumption of uncorrelatedness among the fac-
tors in F is likely to apply already at the reduced form level, making the
ordering of the structural shocks immaterial. Moreover, given the chosen
univariate speciﬁcation of the G process, the identiﬁcation of the structural
foreign (non-US) shocks does not require the computation of the Choleski
decomposition. Finally, as to the eﬀects of the country-speciﬁcs h o c k so nt h e
US series in X, the ordering is likely to matter, and, as mentioned in the
text, a suitable economic rationale is provided, based on the variables’ speed
of adjustment to shocks, with a distinction between relatively slow-moving
(ordered ﬁrst) and fast-moving variables (ordered last).
25Finally, in order to enforce orthogonality among structural shocks, prior to the com-
putation of the Γ−1 and Θ−1 matrices, the following steps are necessary: ﬁrst, the foreign-
factor F-VAR innovations ˆ ζ estimated from (6) are regressed by OLS on the estimated
structural common-factor disturbancesˆ ξ to obtain a new estimate, ˜ ζ,f r o mw h i c ht h e
structural disturbances ˆ ψ are then computed. Second, the US-speciﬁc reduced-form dis-
turbances obtained from the F-VAR in (6), ˆ ε

 , are regressed onˆ ξ and ˆ ψ by OLS to obtain
an orthogonal estimate of the idiosyncratic disturbances, ˆ v
 , from which the structural
disturbances ˆ υ are then computed.
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Panel (a) shows the US ﬁnancial fragility index and the three spread series (Agency,
BAA-AAA, and TED); panel (b) plots the US M2 to GDP ratio, Bank loans to
GDP ratio (both in index form) and the extracted US excess liquidity index; panel
(c) portrays the (standardized) non_US common GDP growth factor together
with the US GDP growth rate. The sample is: 1980:1-2009:1.
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Table 1: Forecast error variance decomposition for US variables  
  Panel A: 2-quarter horizon 
resp\sh  e g pd c i cad    exl s  l  h er  f  fr 
e  90.7  6.8  0.16 0.03 0.25  0.20  0.30 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.51 
g  23.1 68.3  0.11 1.33 0.06  0.00  5.28 0.00 0.61 0.01 0.31 0.18 0.24 0.47 
pd  4.81 1.18  79.5 0.42 0.53  1.86  0.93 1.79 1.30 0.25 4.59 0.77 1.75 0.33 
c  19.0 18.4  2.02 54.6 0.22  0.93  0.75 0.00 0.71 0.12 2.08 0.00 0.08 1.06 
i  26.7 27.4  0.11 6.57 32.4  0.10  0.49 0.34 3.01 0.17 0.48 0.13 0.91 1.00 
cad  1.28 1.23  1.57 0.03 0.24  88.0  0.73 0.01 2.27 0.23 0.18 0.06 3.84 0.31 
   0.41 0.44  1.02 27.7 0.10  3.14  64.2 0.25 1.45 0.04 0.71 0.28 0.16 0.07 
exl  2.17 37.7  0.19 10.8 4.50  1.07  3.69 37.7 0.10 0.86 0.27 0.43 0.43 0.02 
s  6.56 0.66  4.14 16.7 0.61  2.03  47.4 1.19 19.2 0.09 1.14 0.25 0.02 0.02 
l  2.39 1.07  6.11 21.4 0.59  0.43  53.8 0.77 4.01 7.14 1.69 0.20 0.25 0.17 
h  1.13 1.13  1.66 14.9 1.21  1.60  29.2 0.33 1.42 0.17 46.9 0.00 0.04 0.28 
er  1.66 1.47  0.60 1.46 1.66  0.64  0.20 0.09 2.92 3.13 0.66 84.7 0.80 0.01 
f  0.17 1.32  5.63 4.38 0.92  11.1  6.22 1.62 1.80 13.7 2.20 2.95 47.8 0.21 
fr  3.56 0.08  2.04 3.70 1.66  1.58  14.1 2.55 9.05 2.22 1.91 1.06 4.83 51.7 
  
  Panel C: 12-quarter horizon 
resp\sh  e g pd c i  cad π exl s  l h er f fr 
e  47.7 13.7  2.27 0.81 1.37 1.10  7.59 0.43  17.1 3.26 2.57 0.20 1.57 0.26 
g  11.0 44.8  3.09 0.35 1.62 2.76  11.5 0.26  18.3 3.68 0.76 0.05 1.45 0.35 
pd  6.68 1.18  64.7 0.96 0.57 5.64  0.94 1.52  5.06 2.71 6.52 0.82 2.06 0.61 
c  13.3 13.4  2.80 38.3 0.22 12.8  1.19 0.38  0.30 1.39 8.22 0.01 0.27 7.38 
i  15.2 24.2  0.53 2.81 11.9 12.9  1.76 0.06  21.2 1.87 6.08 0.04 1.00 0.43 
cad  1.39 4.65  1.08 0.78 0.45 44.0  4.03 0.03  15.5 12.6 6.51 0.40 6.07 2.51 
π  2.74 0.21  4.80 22.7 0.79 8.61  41.2 0.28  9.04 3.65 3.71 0.74 1.45 0.07 
exl  3.74 13.7  1.33 6.64 5.25 20.3  0.59 32.9  9.34 1.52 1.26 0.36 0.14 2.98 
s  7.41 2.32  4.07 14.5 0.91 2.58  40.3 1.68  19.9 0.67 1.42 0.50 1.09 2.68 
l  2.61 2.91  7.00 17.3 0.84 1.12  44.9 1.21  4.88 11.8 2.60 0.36 1.56 0.91 
h  2.05 0.64  1.12 12.4 0.12 0.36  15.1 0.84  11.1 8.96 41.8 0.47 3.14 1.98 
er  4.83 0.56  0.94 4.36 3.28 8.85  1.92 0.17  8.63 1.12 1.20 61.7 2.11 0.35 
f  0.20 0.80  1.62 1.51 0.55 19.5  9.81 0.29  1.37 8.42 2.62 3.53 49.6 0.20 
fr  6.82 0.18  5.41 7.11 2.97 0.87  21.1 2.10  16.7 1.98 2.89 1.26 3.21 27.4 
The Table reports the results of the forecast error variance decomposition analysis for the US variables (rows), relative to the US shocks 
(columns). For instance element (1,2) in Panel A, i.e. 6.8, is the percentage of forecast error variance of US employment explained by the US 
output shock. The variables are real GDP (g), civilian employment (e), real private consumption (c), real private investment (i), fiscal deficit to 
GDP (pd), current account deficit to GDP (cad), CPI all items index (π), three-month Treasury Bills real rate (s), 10-year Federal government 
securities real rate (l), real house prices (h), the real effective exchange rate (er), real share prices (f), the economic/financial fragility indexed (fr), 



























Table 2: Median cumulated  impulse response analysis  for US variables (selected shocks) 
sh↓ Resp→  e g  pd  c i  cad  π  exl  s l h er f fr 
 2  0.32 0.31  -0.08 0.24 0.79 0.05 0.04  -0.12  0.09 -0.11 -0.02  0.34  0.28 0.00 
e 4 0.33 0.30  -0.03  0.23 0.99 0.05  0.12  -0.03  0.19  0.08 -0.10  0.43  0.00  0.05 
 12  0.25 0.18 0.00  0.24  0.50  -0.01  0.15 0.22 0.05 0.04  -0.22  0.43  -0.08 0.02 
 
 2  0.11 0.43 0.05  0.22 0.85 0.04 0.03  -0.43  0.10  0.17  -0.10  -0.25 0.65 -0.01 
g 4 0.15 0.48 0.00  0.21 0.92 0.06 -0.01  -0.35 0.10 0.14  -0.01 0.01  0.15 0.02 
 12  0.18 0.50 0.01  0.23 0.91 0.05 -0.07  -0.16 0.00 0.00 0.17  -0.23 0.68  0.00 
 
 2  0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02  -0.07 -0.03  0.24 0.40  -0.06 0.18  -1.29  0.01 
pd 4 0.02  0.07  0.02 -0.10  0.00 -0.02  -0.13 -0.05  0.09  0.16  0.03 -0.08  -0.90 -0.05 
 12  0.10 0.19 0.00  -0.12 0.26 0.02 -0.24  -0.15 -0.03 -0.03  0.20  -0.32  0.21  -0.03 
 
 2  0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.07 -0.06  0.26 -0.13 0.07 0.01 0.08  -0.11  -0.18  -1.94  0.00 
cad 4 -0.01 -0.06  0.04 -0.18  -0.38 0.19 -0.22 0.27  -0.07 -0.02 -0.12  -0.17 -2.67  0.02 
 12  -0.06 -0.16  0.00 -0.28 -0.84  0.04  -0.28 0.44  -0.02 -0.04  0.05  -0.84 -2.67  0.00 
 
 2  -0.02 -0.17  0.04 -0.06 -0.13 -0.04  0.46  -0.06  -0.19 -0.19 -0.43  -0.10  -1.53 0.14 
π 4  -0.11 -0.25  0.02 -0.01 -0.22 -0.07  0.51  -0.03 0.09 0.05  -0.45  0.04  -1.77 0.11 
 12  -0.12 -0.24  0.00 0.12  -0.24  -0.01  0.56  0.06  0.09  0.10  -0.51  0.43  -1.57  0.03 
 
 2  0.02  0.00 -0.06  0.00 -0.11  0.00  0.04 0.41  -0.13  -0.14  -0.06 0.06  -0.60 0.05 
exl 4  0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.00  0.06 0.41  0.10 0.07  -0.12  0.04 0.21  0.04 
 12  0.03 0.05 0.00 0.05  -0.01 0.00  0.03 0.49  0.02 0.02  -0.11  0.06 0.15  0.00 
 
 2  -0.02  -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.33 -0.07  0.09  0.03  0.19  -0.13  -0.13 0.33  -0.90 0.11 
s 4  -0.12 -0.27 -0.09 -0.04  -0.70  -0.13  0.21 0.27 0.17 0.00 -0.20  0.42  -0.51  0.10 
 12  -0.22 -0.34  0.00 0.05  -0.98 -0.07  0.30  0.29  0.06  0.08 -0.61  0.86 -0.68 0.03 
 
 2  0.01  0.04 -0.10  0.10  0.13  0.02  0.06  -0.05  -0.17 -0.22  0.62  -0.16  1.08  -0.04 
h 4 0.09  0.09  -0.05 0.20 0.60 0.09  0.12  -0.14 0.08 -0.05  0.79  -0.28  1.31  -0.01 
 12  0.03 -0.07  0.00  0.19  0.23 0.03  0.20 0.05 0.02  -0.01 0.87  -0.28 0.66  0.03 
 
 2  0.01  0.04 0.06  -0.02  0.18 0.09 -0.03  -0.06  0.02 0.08 0.02  0.24 3.47 -0.03 
f 4  0.02  0.08  0.01 0.00 0.10 0.08  -0.08 -0.02 -0.01  0.00  0.16  -0.11  3.69  -0.04 
 12  0.06 0.07 0.00  -0.06 0.13 0.03 -0.12 0.01  -0.02  -0.03 0.29  -0.42  3.85  0.00 
                    
 2  -0.03 -0.05  0.03 0.07  -0.19 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06  0.03  0.33 0.17 
fr 4 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.15  0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.06  -0.01 0.17  0.02 0.34  0.08 
 12  -0.01 -0.03  0.01  0.21  -0.12 0.02  0.01 0.26  0.05 0.04 0.20  0.12  -0.11  0.03 
 
 2  0.00  -0.15  -0.08  0.31  0.33  0.21 0.65  0.01  -2.86 -3.10 -1.30  -5.35 -12.0 0.32 
o 4  -0.17  -0.43  0.02 -0.01 -0.68 -0.33  0.81 0.49  -0.58 -0.68 -2.38 -6.20  -12.1  0.38 
 12  -0.52 -0.77 -0.01 -0.02 -1.22 -0.25  1.07  0.12 0.13 0.20  -3.64  -3.43  -17.6  0.06 
 
 2  0.01  0.39 -0.54  0.43 -1.86 -0.16  0.31 -1.24  -1.65 -1.59 -1.66 -9.60  -85.5  1.95 
cp 4  -0.27 -0.41 -0.73  0.61 -3.65 -1.80 1.78  -0.07 -2.60 -2.90 -5.05 -12.9  -84.9  0.65 
 12  -1.23 -1.37 -0.05  1.14 -4.94 -0.81  2.36 -1.11  0.40  0.50 -8.75  -0.79  -91.9  0.13 
                    
 2  0.03 0.07  -0.04 0.09 0.32  -0.01  0.05 -0.10 -0.08 -0.12 -0.02  -0.51 4.50 -0.13 
gf 4 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.38 0.07 -0.05  -0.13  0.17  0.20  0.08 -0.16  3.56  0.03 
 12  0.07  0.09 0.00 0.03 0.38  0.03  -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03  0.16  -0.59 3.78  0.00 
 
 
The Table reports the results of the median cumulated impulse response analysis for the US variables (columns), relative to the various shocks 
(rows). The variables are real GDP (g), civilian employment (e), real private consumption (c), real private investment (i), fiscal deficit to GDP 
(pd), current account deficit to GDP (cad), CPI all items index (π), three-month Treasury Bills real rate (s), 10-year Federal government securities 
real rate (l), real house prices (h), real share prices (f), the economic/financial fragility index (fr), the excess liquidity index (exl), the oil price (o), 






                Table 3: Median cumulated response of (selected) foreign variables to US shocks for OECD and non OECD countries  
Response of foreign output  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD   OECD non  OECD 
  2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12  2  12 
Mean  0.25 0.27 0.96 1.58    -0.07  -0.03  0.15  0.54    -0.01 0.03  -0.20  -0.32   0.00 0.00 0.07  0.02   -0.18 -0.15  -0.53 -0.99 
Std  0.37 0.33 1.75 2.78   0.28 0.32  2.03  2.03   0.50 0.37 1.86 2.02   0.05 0.05 0.26  0.23    0.91  0.67 8.10  8.29 
Q1  0.03  0.06  0.21  0.12   -0.09 -0.05  -0.31  -0.42   -0.09 -0.08 -1.05 -1.07  -0.01 -0.01 -0.02  -0.05   -0.53  -0.32 -1.10  -1.40 
Median 0.12 0.16 0.49 0.53    -0.01 0.01 -0.02  0.01   0.01 0.02  -0.10  -0.22   0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00   -0.12 -0.06 0.09 -0.13 
Q3  0.29 0.39 1.38 2.31   0.05 0.08  0.53  0.71   0.07 0.10 0.24  -0.01   0.01 0.01 0.09  0.05    0.02  0.02 0.83  0.39 
Sk  2.19 1.41 1.89 2.25    -1.04  -2.35 -0.94  0.58    -2.43  -0.33 0.06 0.34    -0.67 0.39 0.96 -0.98   -0.88 -2.28  -1.39 -1.08 
Ku  8.36 5.76 6.99 8.15   5.20  12.61  5.58  2.98    14.69 8.62 3.41 4.66   6.76 6.06 5.31  5.69    9.11 11.92 8.06  7.49 
Response of foreign excess credit  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD   OECD non  OECD 
  2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12  2  12 
Mean  3.09  5.25 -3.22 -3.16   0.59  0.11  -0.58  -1.82   0.13  0.28 -0.95 -1.86  -0.03 -0.09 -0.22  0.01   2.34  2.74  1.41  0.80 
Std  6.30  10.37 6.63 7.08   2.51 4.01  6.19  7.79   2.60 2.25 6.90 7.61   0.65 0.77 1.83  1.74    5.80  4.45  15.80 13.56 
Q1  -0.35 -0.01 -3.69 -5.64  -0.27 -0.27  -1.81  -4.59  -0.55 -0.27 -1.18 -1.64  -0.09 -0.09 -0.27  -0.15   -0.06  0.11 -7.21  -5.16 
Median 0.55 1.61  -0.67  -1.87   0.23 0.51  0.07 -0.66    -0.01 0.08  -0.09  -0.07   0.00 0.00  -0.10 -0.05    0.59  0.82  -1.30 -0.43 
Q3  3.84 5.29  -0.22 0.07   0.88 1.70  1.42  1.48   0.92 0.86 1.63 1.48   0.09 0.16 0.08  0.17    2.10  3.10 7.36  3.32 
Sk  2.66  3.17 -2.50 -1.62  -1.28 -2.23  -2.27  -1.98  -0.28 -0.06 -2.95 -2.30  -1.55 -2.68 -2.08  -0.66   1.27  1.92  1.33  1.31 
Ku  10.75 14.33  8.93  6.13   8.56  8.87  9.12  7.43  11.10  5.99 11.31  7.56   8.36 12.29  9.13  7.15   5.00  5.78  6.32  6.44 
Response of foreign house prices  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD   OECD non  OECD 
  2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12  2  12 
Mean  0.09 -0.04       -0.15 -0.06       0.43  0.94       0.01 -0.01       0.33  -0.05    
Std  0.55  1.29       0.26  0.86       0.67  0.86       0.06  0.11       0.79  0.88    
Q1  -0.13 -0.56       -0.33 -0.84       -0.03  0.20      -0.04 -0.12       -0.38  -1.01    
Median -0.01 -0.16       -0.09  0.17       0.15  0.78      -0.01 -0.02       0.14  -0.10    
Q3  0.41  0.62       -0.02  0.31       0.52  1.79       0.01  0.04       0.59  0.60    
Sk  -0.72 -0.50       -0.85 -0.04       1.15  0.24       1.14  0.35       0.37  0.09    
Ku  3.13  4.38       3.64  2.91       3.50  1.59       3.51  2.19       2.00  2.10    
Response of foreign stock prices  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD    OECD non  OECD   OECD non  OECD 
  2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12 2  12   2  12 2  12    2  12  2  12 
Mean  25.53 27.16 46.04 52.04   0.07  5.76 -10.06  11.44  22.09 18.97 30.25 18.05  -1.22 -1.61 -4.38  -5.34   -9.48 -17.76 22.77  -3.00 
Std  28.69 35.14 50.29 64.32  18.17 21.55  19.30  33.84  14.93 12.78 30.14 29.66   4.33  5.39  7.75  9.43   52.08  45.65 57.54  56.73 
Q1  8.28 10.31 14.25  9.33   -3.91 -2.53 -25.43 -22.98  11.90 11.30  2.38 -4.55  -1.95 -3.08 -8.47 -10.24  -13.40 -34.10 -6.49 -20.98 
Median 19.10 20.20 22.15 26.65   1.44  5.21  -6.19  5.50  17.50 15.70 23.00  9.42   0.15  0.11 -5.32  -5.57   4.25  -4.91 14.02  0.30 
Q3  24.30 30.60 68.78 64.53   4.30 12.70  -0.03  30.45  25.22 26.89 33.58 20.45   1.28  1.10 -0.65  -0.11   9.41  5.52 39.48  13.93 
Sk  2.52 1.89 1.80 2.23    -1.99  -0.88 -0.83  0.67   1.27 0.74 0.67 1.07    -2.25  -1.80  -0.38 -1.07   -3.76 -1.92 0.10  0.74 
Ku  9.68 9.06 5.95 7.89    10.40 7.52  3.13  2.65   4.15 2.95 2.25 2.83   8.14 5.96 3.46  4.79   18.79  7.40 3.42  5.05 
 
                 The Table reports descriptive statistics for the cross section of dynamic responses of selected foreign variables to US shocks: mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std), first (Q1), second (Median) and third (Q3)  
                 quartile, index of skewness (Sk) and kurtosis (Ku). Results refers to OECD (+ Israel) and non OECD countries.                Table 4: Median cumulated response of (selected) foreign variables to US shocks for European and Eastern European countries  
Response of foreign output  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe 
  2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12    2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  0.18 0.21  0.63  0.79    -0.05  -0.01 -0.13  0.06   0.08 0.08  -0.61  -0.39   0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.03    -0.02 -0.02 -1.16 -0.66 
Std  0.25  0.24 0.79 1.02    0.23  0.17 0.29 0.08    0.28  0.27  0.89  0.56    0.04  0.04 0.08 0.06    0.69 0.30 1.38 1.24 
Q1  0.02 0.06  0.05  0.06    -0.05  -0.03 -0.46  0.00    -0.04  -0.06  -1.62  -1.07   0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.10    -0.25 -0.12 -2.73 -1.92 
Median 0.10 0.15  0.12  0.15    -0.01 0.03  0.00  0.01   0.01 0.02  -0.34  -0.25   0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01    -0.03 -0.03 -0.89 -0.32 
Q3  0.22  0.31 0.94 0.95    0.05  0.07 0.03 0.07    0.07  0.11  -0.08  0.02    0.01  0.01 0.00  -0.01    0.02 0.02  -0.36 0.00 
Sk  1.42 0.76  0.51  0.77    -2.27  -1.70 -0.99  0.70   3.02 2.60  -0.93  -0.60   1.90 1.96 -1.07 -0.48   2.26  2.03 -0.75 -1.14 
Ku  4.53  3.21 1.05 1.71    8.08  5.65 2.20 1.48    11.79  10.24  2.09  1.38    5.49  6.41 2.47 1.36    9.56 8.72 1.85 2.53 
Response of foreign excess credit  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe 
  2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12    2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  1.58 2.48 -2.37  0.63   0.45 1.04 -0.56 -2.86    -0.47 0.09 1.77  -1.38   0.08 0.06  0.43  0.58   2.23  1.96  5.70  2.86 
Std  3.48  4.81  11.95  13.29    1.21  1.79 4.60 6.77    2.34  1.77  3.93  7.07    0.32  0.25 1.38 1.92    4.36 3.14 8.91 3.05 
Q1  -0.25  -0.02  -13.44  -12.03    -0.28  -0.10 -5.16 -9.92    -0.56  -0.09  -1.45  -8.21    -0.07  -0.09 -0.47 -0.66    -0.01  0.09 -2.25 -0.39 
Median 0.41 0.97  0.35  2.36   0.16 0.52  0.05 -2.80    -0.06 0.15 1.07  -1.73   0.00 0.00 -0.14  0.00   0.64  0.73 -0.50  3.12 
Q3  1.51  2.28 3.91 7.50    0.39  1.79 1.64 0.41    0.21  0.56  1.60  1.41    0.03  0.04 0.28 0.22    1.84 2.43 9.76 3.73 
Sk  2.83 2.64 -1.27 -1.13   1.85 1.10 -0.94 -0.70    -3.10  -2.61 0.96  -0.64   2.66 1.69  1.08  1.13   2.29  2.11  0.39 -0.05 
Ku  11.00  9.86 2.77 2.55    6.08  4.50 2.30 2.00    12.54  10.60  2.34  2.05    9.93  5.49 2.49 2.62    7.03 6.93 1.29 1.65 
Response of foreign house prices  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe 
  2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12    2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  0.06 -0.06      -0.19 -0.02       0.52  1.08       0.01  0.00       0.43  -0.06    
Std  0.58  1.42       0.25  0.89       0.72  0.86       0.07  0.11       0.85  0.91    
Q1  -0.14 -0.52      -0.37 -0.79       -0.01  0.48      -0.04 -0.10       -0.33  -0.88    
Median -0.01 -0.22      -0.10  0.14       0.33  0.81      -0.01 -0.01       0.34  -0.21    
Q3  0.38  0.61      -0.05  0.33       0.81  1.81       0.02  0.08       0.98  0.50    
Sk  -0.68 -0.43      -1.21 -0.02       0.85  0.05       1.01  0.24       0.12  0.18    
Ku  2.75  3.64       3.63  2.86       2.76  1.45       2.88  2.10       1.71  2.10    
Response of foreign stock prices  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe    Europe Eastern  Europe 
  2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12    2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  25.21 26.77  47.33  47.11   4.05  7.36  2.85  6.48  21.27 18.97 32.19 25.42  -0.17 -0.10  -4.50  -6.66   -7.87 -12.07 -10.21 -43.16 
Std  22.84 19.81  77.25 112.31   7.77  9.76  22.29  21.88  13.50 11.78 33.54 24.63   2.27  2.21  9.58  13.48  65.11  46.55  47.69  40.20 
Q1  9.87 11.43  8.07 -20.10  -2.14  0.96 -19.75 -18.95  10.93  8.03  6.90  6.64  -1.73 -1.66 -13.60 -19.78   -0.43 -12.28 -45.40 -87.25 
Median 19.55 21.45  19.90  11.53   3.15  7.30  -1.21  3.10  16.93 15.95 19.52 12.80   0.48  0.56  -1.74  -3.52   6.41  -3.58 -26.20 -55.50 
Q3  25.63 32.10  21.98  20.65   5.11 12.18  12.96  21.10  24.23 27.17 33.42 28.96   1.20  1.14  0.32  -1.58  10.50  4.66 -10.98 -17.75 
Sk  1.68 1.37  1.32  1.18   1.42 0.45  0.23 -0.21   1.33 0.39 0.81 0.72    -1.23  -1.07 -1.25 -1.04    -3.28 -2.97  0.83 -0.03 
Ku  4.82  4.71 2.86 2.68    5.08  3.70 1.07 1.05    4.10  2.09  1.98  1.76    3.97  3.16 2.74 2.48    13.24  11.82 2.14 1.03 
 
The Table reports descriptive statistics for the cross section of dynamic responses of selected foreign variables to US shocks: mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std), first (Q1), second (Median) and third (Q3) quartile, index 
of skewness (Sk) and kurtosis (Ku). Results refers to European (+ Canada) and Eastern European (+ Russia) countries.                Table 5: Median cumulated response of (selected) foreign variables to US shocks for Asian and Latin American countries  
Response of foreign output  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America 
  2 12  2  12   2  12 2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  0.94  1.46 0.42 0.67   0.13 0.52 0.06 0.02    0.05  -0.07  -0.11  -0.40    0.06  0.00 0.01 0.02    -0.60  -0.90  -0.17  -0.05 
Std  1.79  2.86 0.90 1.50   2.17 2.18 0.49 0.75    1.91  2.15 0.62 0.52    0.28  0.24 0.04 0.05    8.62 8.79 1.02 1.09 
Q1  0.17 0.15 -0.39 -0.67   -0.44 -0.49 -0.42 -0.74    -0.10  -0.46 -0.66 -0.89    -0.06  -0.06 -0.03 -0.03    -0.47 -0.75 -1.04 -0.80 
Median 0.32 0.33  0.38  0.66   -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.20   0.04 0.00 -0.21 -0.30    -0.01  -0.03 -0.01  0.00    -0.03 -0.10 -0.56 -0.62 
Q3  0.90  1.25 0.57 0.73   0.47 0.64 0.32 0.41    0.36  0.24 0.00  -0.14    0.10  0.02 0.01 0.04    0.60 0.33 0.06 0.00 
Sk  2.07  2.49  -0.09 0.37    -0.85 0.53  -0.17  -0.08    -0.26  0.01  -0.01  -1.24    0.91  -0.73 0.85 0.41    -1.28  -1.05 0.53 0.88 
Ku  7.11  8.56 1.95 2.04   4.83 2.57 1.40 1.32    3.50  4.05 1.92 2.72    4.56  4.82 2.08 1.53    7.09 6.75 1.42 1.94 
Response of foreign excess credit  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America 
  2 12  2  12   2  12 2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  2.45  3.67  -0.72 1.11    -0.42  -1.73 0.65  -2.14    -1.29  -1.26 0.70 0.33    -0.75  -0.72 0.46 0.52    0.93 2.39 2.76 2.27 
Std  8.65  14.64 7.09  10.26   6.77 8.04 1.98 5.48    7.24  7.36 2.05 2.75    1.77  1.57 0.53 0.53    16.44  14.08 7.93  10.15 
Q1  -1.45  -2.38 -6.77 -7.82    -1.83 -2.45 -1.01 -8.44   -1.03  -0.79 -1.56 -2.84   -0.80  -0.68  0.07  0.02   -6.69 -2.83 -5.20 -7.14 
Median -0.45 -0.45  -1.80  -1.65   -0.16  -0.21  0.37  -1.11   -0.11 -0.24  0.92  0.86   -0.11 -0.11  0.10  0.26   -0.29  0.27  -0.02  -0.93 
Q3  1.17  0.85  -0.36 2.52   1.70 1.18 0.59 0.89    0.31  0.77 1.67 1.50    -0.02  -0.03 0.62 0.83    2.74 3.13 6.85 6.21 
Sk  2.11  2.50 0.50 0.64    -1.97  -2.10 0.92  -0.67    -2.77  -2.82  -0.58  -0.30    -2.36  -1.86 0.57 0.18    1.40 1.12  -0.07 0.13 
Ku  6.86  8.66 2.09 1.76   7.44 7.46 2.28 1.73    10.03  10.20 1.80 1.43    7.86  5.22 1.23 1.07    6.26 5.71 1.35 1.33 
Response of foreign stock prices  to unitary US shocks 
  output shock    excess liquidity shock    house price shock    stock price shock    fragility shock 
  Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America    Asia Latin  America 
  2 12  2  12   2  12 2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12  2  12   2 12 2  12 
Mean  34.68 38.14  43.28  47.82  -15.30  4.65  -7.68  14.53  24.02 17.00  36.07  17.71   0.93  2.39  -6.49  -7.37  28.52  6.53 -18.03 -30.92 
Std  38.43 43.17  37.20  40.04   23.75  41.81  18.09  25.90  23.71 25.41  25.84  27.54  16.44 14.08  5.34  5.87  45.81  54.47  48.83  52.68 
Q1  6.83  3.85  13.55  18.00  -28.43 -24.13 -27.00 -13.87   8.34 -5.72  11.67  -0.14   -6.69 -2.83 -11.27 -12.35   -5.83 -20.18 -73.55 -94.80 
Median 19.75 25.20  18.20  26.00   -8.32  -0.94  -7.99  6.58  20.40 13.00  23.80  7.50   -0.29  0.27  -8.74 -10.70  11.57  5.13  4.82 -20.00 
Q3  39.45 58.00  55.20  55.45   0.67  11.19  -0.41  34.05  28.78 22.53  50.85  13.25   2.74  3.13  -3.85  -4.46  34.83  18.10  6.91  2.26 
Sk  1.46  1.63 0.57 0.66   -1.39 0.43  -0.27  -0.35   0.91  1.11 0.27 1.21   1.40  1.12 0.24 0.43   1.47 0.97  -0.95 -0.54 
Ku  4.37  5.48 1.42 1.45   3.73 2.62 1.66 1.22    3.26  3.86 1.04 2.68    6.26  5.71 1.13 1.03    3.91 4.93 2.11 1.36 
 
The Table reports descriptive statistics for the cross section of dynamic responses of selected foreign variables to US shocks: mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std), first (Q1), second (Median) and third (Q3) quartile, index 













APPENDIX A: Robustness analysis 
 
Table 1A: Median cumulated  impulse response analysis  for US variables (selected shocks) 
Sh↓ Resp→  e g  pd  c i  cad  π  exl  s l h er f fr 
 2  0.25 0.11  -0.07 0.08 0.12 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.05  -0.07 0.06  0.25  -0.14 -0.02 
e 4 0.25 0.12  -0.02 0.06 0.28  0.02 0.01  0.06  0.10  0.01  -0.03 0.20  -0.13 0.00 
 12  0.19  0.02 0.00 0.03  -0.07  -0.01  0.03 0.17 0.02 0.01  -0.13  0.23  -0.21  0.00 
 
 2  0.12 0.33 0.06 0.06 0.26 0.07 -0.12  -0.27 0.10  0.23  0.02  -0.46  0.05  -0.04 
g 4 0.15 0.42 0.00 0.01 0.33  0.07  -0.19  -0.20 0.02 0.09 0.11  -0.20  -0.46 -0.02 
 12  0.19 0.44 0.00 -0.01  0.35  0.05  -0.29  -0.12 -0.03 -0.04  0.32  -0.65  0.18 -0.02 
 
 2  -0.01 0.04 0.05  -0.03  -0.04  -0.06  -0.01 -0.09  0.24 0.38  -0.09 0.16  -0.80  0.02 
pd 4 0.01 0.10 0.01  -0.01 0.07  -0.05 -0.06  -0.15  0.09  0.15  -0.01 -0.02  -0.33 -0.05 
 12  0.09  0.24  0.00 0.00 0.38  0.02 -0.14  -0.25  -0.02 -0.01  0.14  -0.15  0.58  -0.03 
 
 2  0.02 -0.01  0.07 -0.08  -0.08  0.26 -0.12 0.08 0.01 0.09  -0.11  -0.13  -2.07  0.00 
cad 4 -0.01 -0.07  0.05 -0.19 -0.42  0.19  -0.23  0.26 -0.05 0.00  -0.08  -0.20  -2.69  0.01 
 12  -0.04 -0.16  0.00 -0.32 -0.79  0.04  -0.30 0.40  -0.03 -0.05  0.10  -0.87 -2.52  -0.01 
 
 2  -0.02 -0.17  0.04  -0.06 -0.13 -0.04  0.46  -0.05  -0.18 -0.18 -0.44  -0.09  -1.58 0.15 
π 4  -0.11 -0.24  0.02 -0.01 -0.21 -0.07 0.52  -0.02 0.10 0.06  -0.45  0.07  -1.79 0.11 
 12  -0.13 -0.25  0.00 0.13  -0.25  -0.01  0.59  0.08  0.08 0.08  -0.54  0.47  -1.67  0.03 
 
 2  0.02  0.01  -0.05  0.01 -0.06  0.01  0.03  0.40 -0.18 -0.14 -0.06 0.02  -0.41 0.03 
exl 4  0.04  0.09 0.02 0.04 0.19 0.02  0.03 0.37  0.07 0.07  -0.12  -0.07 0.29  0.02 
 12  0.06  0.10 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.01 -0.02 0.45  0.01 0.00  -0.03  -0.06 0.29  0.00 
 
 2  -0.02  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.34 -0.07  0.09  0.10  0.18 -0.15  -0.14 0.35  -0.98 0.11 
s 4  -0.11 -0.26 -0.08 -0.03  -0.68 -0.12  0.21  0.34  0.18  0.01  -0.24 0.44  -0.48  0.11 
 12  -0.21 -0.33  0.00 0.04  -0.97 -0.07  0.31  0.38  0.07  0.09 -0.63  0.88 -0.65 0.03 
 
 2  0.02  0.04 -0.09  0.11  0.15  0.02  0.06 -0.05 -0.18 -0.24  0.62  -0.17  1.09  -0.04 
h 4 0.08  0.10  -0.05 0.20 0.61 0.09  0.12  -0.13 0.07 -0.05  0.80  -0.30 1.28 -0.02 
 12  0.03  -0.07 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.03  0.19 0.05 0.02  -0.02 0.88  -0.34 0.65  0.02 
 
 2  0.01 0.04 0.06  -0.02  0.18 0.09 -0.03  -0.06  0.02 0.08 0.02  0.24 3.57 -0.03 
f 4  0.02  0.08  0.01 0.00 0.11 0.08  -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01  0.16  -0.10  3.77 -0.05 
 12  0.05 0.07 0.00  -0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.14 0.01  -0.02  -0.04 0.29  -0.39  3.92 -0.01 
                   
 2  -0.03 -0.05  0.03  0.07  -0.18 0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.06  0.03 0.32 0.16 
fr 4 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.15  0.12  0.06  -0.03 0.00 0.06  -0.01 0.16  -0.01 0.33  0.08 
 12  -0.02  -0.05 0.01 0.20  -0.16 0.02  0.01 0.27  0.05 0.03 0.19  0.13  -0.19  0.03 
 
 
The Table reports the results of the median cumulated impulse response analysis for the US variables (columns), relative to the various shocks 
(rows). The variables are real GDP (g), civilian employment (e), real private consumption (c), real private investment (i), fiscal deficit to GDP 
(pd), current account deficit to GDP (cad), CPI all items index (π), three-month Treasury Bills real rate (s), 10-year Federal government securities 
real rate (l), real house prices (h), real share prices (f), the economic/financial fragility index (fr), the excess liquidity index (exl). Figures in bold 
are significant at the 10% level.  